Philosophy

The politics of respectability

I try to stay out of discussions of trans-related issues, because it’s not my place, but also because most anti-trans or ‘gender critical’ arguments are shallow and bad faith – post-hoc rationalisations of bigotry. However, debates within the LGBT community are more interesting to me, because all the participants share an overlapping epistemic basis – they have experienced the same oppression, they share the same ‘lived experience’. So we come to a recent [unproductive] ‘debate’ on YouTube between, among others, Clara Sorrenti (a.k.a. keffals), a [controversial] transwoman and streamer, and Buck Angel, a [controversial] transman and well-known gender-critical conservative. In setting out his views (see below from 3:20), Angel essentially made two claims. Firstly, that social recognition of a non-cis gender identity should be contingent on putting in the effort to pass as a gender other than the one assigned at birth; to wit, Angel would use a male bathroom because over multiple decades he had extensively invested in ‘passing’ as a man. And secondly, that the thing that most alienated Angel and ‘ordinary people’ from the so-called trans movement was their authoritarian insistence on ‘compelling’ recognition of their gender identity.

Now, my first inclination was to dismiss all this out of hand. In the first instance, Angel is merely re-stating the well-trodden ‘transmedicalist’ position that what matters is ‘passing’ – that members of the trans community have to conform to stereotypes of the gender binary (to be more masculine than men, to be more feminine than women) in order to exist safely in mainstream society. And the accusation of leftist tyranny or illiberal progressivism is a veritably ancient right-wing canard at this point. But it occurs to me that in actuality these two arguments are the same argument. Moreover, this pattern of argumentation recurs over and over again throughout history – for example, among black communities in the US, among the indigenous community in Australia – and this recurrence of this divide among marginalised peoples reveals something interesting about how humans do politics. And perhaps in a contemporary Australian context, it might help illuminate why the indigenous community takes divergent views on a constitutional Voice, and why large chunks of potential voters find the prospect of a Voice referendum so off-putting.

Respectability Politics

To put it simply, Angel is arguing that recognition (of one’s gender identity) must be earned – mainly through compliance with social norms and expectations. And to put it somewhat uncharitably, progressives demand recognition of their identity, regardless of whether or not they comply with social expectations. It is fair and accurate to say that this dichotomy (spoiler alert, it’s false) is fundamental to the pursuit of social change. Even when progressive movements couch their demands in solid liberal terms of universal access to rights, much of the backlash against them comes from the centrist perception that to demand equality is somehow illegitimate. So, for example, large parts of the LGBT community believed that integrating into respectable society through adherence to monogamous models of marriage and family life were the key to acceptance; black conservatives think their community has to behave ‘respectably’ in order to cut down on police violence; and the modern welfare state makes recipients of state transfers demonstrate their ‘moral worthiness’ before providing them those critical economic supports necessary for their survival. In most cases, access to dignity is conceded upon performance of some ritual humiliation or submission – i.e. compliance with a social norm. For Angel, to demand equality on the other hand is to tacitly admit one has failed to earn it. Or to make an analogy, to ask for state support is to admit one has failed to earn a basic standard of living in the market; and to ask for cultural or linguistic diversity is to admit failure to integrate.

Now, one could argue that Angel’s argument – let’s call it the respectability position – is merely tactical. That members of oppressed minorities consider the most effective route to achieving political change and assess that social compliance is more likely to lead to the majority of the desired gains. And certainly, for trans individuals who can pass sufficiently well to go ‘stealth’, that may be true. But I don’t think that’s all that’s going on. The tactical explanation does not address why this is the dominant view of large swathes or non-minority populations – ranging from well-meaning cis liberals and centrists to right-wing libertarians and other persuadable groups with no stakes in reform. Respect for existing hierarchies is, after all, one of the foundational dimensions of human political personality. And individuals who lean more conservative on other issues are also more likely to adhere to the respectability position. In fact, the demand that liberal societies recognise the actual equal autonomy of all citizens to express themselves and be treated as full members of society regardless of their ethnic, religious, sexual or other status is in fact vanishingly rare.

I’m currently in the middle of researching my next project on the history of liberalism, so this pattern seems very familiar. There’s an inherent contradiction at the heart of liberalism, between it’s idealised expression of the universal equality of all mankind and the reality, which is that for almost the entirety of the liberal era some populations have been considered more equal than others. Thomas Jefferson, who famously wrote that ‘all men are created equal’, just as famously owned and abused slaves. But even beyond the individual hypocrites, just who is considered an ‘active citizen’, a member of the political community deserving of respect, and who forms part of the masses to be governed (‘passive citizens’) has long been contested. The history of progress is by-and-large a history of expanding the conception of what it means to be human. And a core part of that has been moving beyond mere legal or symbolic equality to ensure in Elizabeth Anderson’s phrase, equality of dignity. That includes, of course, the right to be heard and have one’s conception of self recognised as legitimate. By denying marginalised groups their own culture or individuals their right to self-actualisation, liberals require assimilation into the status quo prior to granting recognition of others as full citizens. This contradiction has been the motor driving social reform, while laying a seed of resentful instability that can germinate into fascism.

Recognition must be given – or taken

So here’s why the divide between earning and demanding rights is something of a false one. In both cases, recognition must ultimately be given by someone with power to someone without. I am not enough of a liberal to believe that rights have a transcendent quality that pre-exist social relationships – recognition and substantiation of rights requires collective, social action. Ultimately, respectability politics of the type advocated for by Buck Angel, or Thomas Sowell, or Noel Pearson, doesn’t work because the position of a plurality of opponents is driven by base disgust and fear of loss – particularly, an irrational fear of a relative loss of social position. Most gender-critical men and women will never tolerate trans people – not even within the prescribed margins tacitly conceded by the transmedicalists – because they view the existence of any trans person at all as a threat, driven by feelings of personal disgust, confusion and rejection. As keffals points out, throughout history minority groups have been met with both public and private violence, legal suppression and harassment. American conservatives have basically already conceded that bills banning trans healthcare for minors, or to ban trans individuals from sport etc., are the thin end of the wedge towards their complete removal from public existence. Out of sight, out of mind.  

But it’s not enough to merely demand recognition, either. And doing so, as we have seen, may alienate those liberals and centrists who resent any expectation that they have to act to improve society somewhat. The notion that they cannot be existentially secure in their [undeserved] social position until and unless marginalised people are also secure is a truth that threatens the very core of their immense self-regard. Until and unless minority groups have the power and organisation to take recognition by force – to seize influence over key institutions and win rights on their own terms – that recognition will continue to be withheld. And in all honesty, the trans community – and indigenous peoples here in Australia – probably lack the sheer numbers to prevail in that kind of political fight. I’m not saying don’t do it. Pressure needs to be exerted from all directions and coercion is an essential part of building any social norm. But galling as it may be, progress will probably be won when the vast body of self-satisfied liberals deign to grant recognition of minority rights ‘as a gift’. The act of charitable giving re-enforces the centrist’s own sense of moral superiority and generosity. So there must be a fine balance between bullying and cajoling; a battered liberal will just as easily become a fascist.

Politics as charity

Does this carry any relevance for the referendum campaign for a Voice for indigenous Australians? I’m on the record as supporting the Voice proposal as a route to political representation, but I’m afraid that the mood of the public is souring and the window to make a make a positive case for constitutional change is narrowing. But the motivation of the Voice’s non-indigenous but well-meaning supporters appears to be not constitutional re-design but recognition of colonised peoples as full citizens. For liberals, the symbolism of the Voice - including their ‘recognition’ in the constitution - is the point; it will cost the centre nothing in real terms. So I think the Prime Minister’s messaging about relying on Australians’ ‘best qualities’ is probably his best saving throw at this point. The referendum will get up if and only if the government is able to convince sufficient voters that they’re good enough people to make the most minor of symbolic concessions to a historically marginalised group of people, whose land and culture we stole. Some might think that’s an easy victory; for me, it appears to sit on a knife’s edge. The politics of this kind of political charity may be frustrating and insulting to genuine leftists - we don’t beg - but fortunately, it’s a skill at which most high-status liberals excel.

Making sense of dialectical materialism

I recently read Tristan Hunt’s [now-dated] biography of Friedrich Engels on vacation. I may have also subjected myself to a ‘debate’ on Marxist philosophy between leftish YouTuber Vaush and ML-adjacent anarchist Emerican Johnson (‘EJ’), I’ve been struck how both professional historians such as Hunt and amateurs such as Vaush both deploy a vulgar understanding of Marxist terminology and concepts - a language of modes of production, fixed stages of development, class contradiction and the inevitability of revolution that reflects a good-quality liberal education during which Marx was taught - but never applied. Empty symbols, signifying nothing. But thinkers on the left often do themselves few favours. Academic philosophy is always obtuse and much of Marx’s and Engel’s insight has become ossified and calcified with a century of additions, explanations and assumed knowledge. I have to admit, when someone truly knowledgeable and enmeshed in this way of thought (such as EJ) tries to explain it, I cringe. It’s often incomprehensible, and so removed from conventional Western modes of thought that the left can appear mad, divorced from commonsense notions or isolated in its ivory tower. Classical Marxism is almost, but not quite, crank philosophy.

Nevertheless, as I’ve grown and matured as a writer I’ve found there’s valuable insights in the old texts. Simple awareness of the existence and operation of alternative ontological, metaphysical, epistemological and metaethical assumptions can help us overcome much of the social and interpersonal conflict that those assumptions generate. So this will be a blog about dialectical materialism - the philosophical framework in which Marx and Engels operated. The two founders of modern anti-capitalism are best known as political economists, historians and sociologists, but were first and foremost philosophers. Unhelpfully, their framework was so foundational to their thinking that they never bothered to write it all down in one place. So what we have is mostly snippets, dutifully assembled and given coherence by later scholars [even the name, ‘dialectical materialism’, is a subsequent invention by Karl Kautsky]. These scholars themselves often laboured under tyrannical regimes. It is wrong to claim, as Vaush did, that ‘dialectical materialism’ exists only to justify the behaviour of autocrats. But it is true that Lenin, Stalin and Mao each contributed in some way. Make of that what you will. My case is simply that beneath a century of mystification, there’s still some things worth knowing.

What ‘Dialectical Materialism’ is not

There are several methods by which one might approach large topics: to define a thing by what it is not; to put it in the context of its intellectual history; and finally, to outline what a thing is and what it does. I always find the third approach the most useful, and its where I’ll focus my efforts later, but we’ll start in true dialectical fashion with its negation. Marxists use several pieces of terminology in ways alien to modern philosophers; the most important of these is ‘metaphysics’. Metaphysics is to the modern mind merely the philosophical study of the fundamental nature of reality; so dialectical materialism is simply a branch of metaphysics. But what Marxists counterpose dialectics against metaphysics they mean specifically Western metaphysics, and in particular the mode of thought dominant in post-Enlightenment Europe.

“To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. . . . For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.” [Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific"]

“The metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world outlook sees things as isolated, static and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. . . . Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different.” [Mao, “On Contradiction”]

Dialectics and ‘metaphysics’, thus, are put forward as two opposed ways of understanding the world, although they are not exclusive opposites, and most people think at least part of the time in both modes. The metaphysical mode is a world of mental categories, where physical objects and concepts have fixed definitions and argumentation proceeds from axioms in a formal manner. The metaphysician struggles to come up with a working definition of ‘chair’; the dialectician simply notes they’re used for sitting and moves on. Consider whether we can have a fixed definition of even simple concepts such as of ‘woman’, ‘worker’, ‘person of colour’, ‘privilege’; how much easier it is to observe that these are constructs that imply a social relationship: the patriarchy, the wage relation, white supremacy, inequality. There are no hard and fast barriers between categories, no bright lines, only shades of one thing into another.

Classical logic - which is still very influential in analytic philosophy of the American type - has three ‘laws of thought’, all of which dialectical materialism rejects to some degree.

  • The law of identity (A = A). A thing is always itself. An object is, rather than becomes. But if everything in the universe is on constant motion and interaction, then from moment-to-moment a thing is always different from what it was a moment before. “[T]he plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct form itself, by absorption and excretion” [Engels]. Are you the same person you were when you were born? Most of your cells are constantly dying and being replaced, the very atoms that comprise your body being recycled into the environment.

  • The law of non-contradiction (A ≠ A’). Something cannot be both true and false simultaneously. This is a big one, but as an axiom it’s extremely flimsy. Is a quantum particle over here or over there? It is a particle or wave? Is an object bound in a position by a centripetal force in motion or still? Can a complex system be stable while its constituent elements behave chaotically? Can a person be privileged in some respects while simultaneously being oppressed in others? Can a person be assigned female at birth and yet present as male? The answer to all these questions is yes.

  • The law of the excluded middle (something is either A or A’). In classical logic, a proposition is either true or false, right or wrong. A category can always be defined as a completely closed system. There is no third option. But to a dialecticion this rigid either/or binary is unnecessary. What is true is contingent, conditional and relational: an individual can be a worker in some aspects of their life and an ‘owner’ in others; a person’s racial or gender categorisation, self-image and/or presentation can shift depending on social (and historical) context. Concepts are not timeless perfect forms but themselves messy, half-formed and incomplete.

The Marxist rejection of much of Western logic and metaphysics has fueled accusations it is anti-Enlightenment, anti-science or anti-empirical; but dialectical material is no less a product of the Enlightenment, the scientific method and empiricism. It merely operates from a different set of assumptions. As I wrote in my second book, ‘Evolutionary Politics: Socialism for Social Species’:

“[There is] a broader tradition in philosophy that emphasises the empirical, material and dynamic over the ideal, transcendent and static. In process philosophy, systems are not defined as categories of things but by processes ­– motion, change and becoming. Stability and harmony are mere illusions, sustained by the dynamic tension of sub-structural forces. In the same way that Marxism is the study of economic and political change via dialectical materialism, evolutionary theory is the study of the emergence of social and biological order through the process of natural selection.”

The second key Marxist negation is of Idealism - which logically enough is counterposed against materialism. This is not merely a rejection of naïve optimism [‘Utopianism’]. But rather a rejection of the reduction of reality to objects existing solely in the human brain. Idealism is no longer considered cutting-edge in Western philosophy, but continues to exert strong influence over the thinking of non-philosophers - especially liberals. Like existentialists, dialectical materialists hold that existence generates the essence of being. Truth cannot be deduced from reason alone. For the Idealist, the course of human history can be charted by the history of ideas that motivated human behaviour, but for Marx: “The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. . . . Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.” [“The German Ideology”]

Dialectics: an abbreviated intellectual history

While the ‘metaphysical’ mode of thought is evidenced in history at least as far as Plato, dialectics was also present at the dawn of recorded philosophical inquiry. Heraclitus, the great pre-Socratic cynic, wrote a single, idiosyncratic work (fittingly titled ‘On Nature’), of which only fragments survive. But those cryptic fragments already contain much of the dialectic worldview, as recognised by Marx and Engels nearly 2500 years later. For Heraclitus, all things ‘came into being through strife [the conflict of opposites]’; stability arose dynamically from conflict and tension, and without conflict, the world would cease to move. Heraclitus wrote that the ‘way up is also the way down’, emphasising that the properties of an object were a matter of perspective, and that an object was necessarily both A and not A simultaneously. His most famous aphorism, that ‘It is impossible to step in the same river twice’, illustrates through parable the idea that categories we believe are certain are actually in constant motion - everything changes and nothing stands still. But by the same token, we also change: each time we step into the river we ourselves are also different.

For the majority of Greek philosophers, however, dialectics meant simply a method of reasoning - think of a Socratic dialogue in which two imagined speakers approach the truth by offering each other propositions and counter-propositions in order to identify points of disagreement or contradiction. For millennia, it was taught as the poor cousin of logic and rhetoric, and as late as Kant in in the late eighteen century it was seen primarily as an exercise to expose weaknesses and paradoxes in an argument since in classical logic the exposure of a contradiction could only lead to the utter negation of an argument. Dialectics was not a route to moral or intellectual progress as that would have implied the participants could generate new arguments ex nihilo.

That was where things stood until Hegel at the turn of the nineteenth century. I don’t pretend to understand Hegel and I’ve never read his original work. But, speaking generally, Hegel was a strict Idealist who was interested in understanding the process of Enlightenment. To do this, he revived dialectics: for Hegel, the initial attempt to understand a thing in the abstract is necessarily imperfect; so the categorisation of things necessarily contains self-contradiction (‘negations’). But rather than invalidating the category, the abstract and the negation sublate one another to generate a concrete idea that better corresponds with reality. Rather than being destructive, the messiness and conflict inherent in philosophy was seen as generative, pushing understanding forward [which is clearly true].

In a modern liberal education, this triadic system is often taught as ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’, but this terminology belonged to Kant and Johann Fichte. Hegel in fact rejected any formalisation of the triadic system as a ‘lifeless schema’. Hegel [and as we shall see, his followers] never thought of the negation as being somehow necessarily one of opposition or contradiction - in fact, thinking in such binary terms is strong evidence of ‘metaphysical’ thinking and is often at the root of misunderstandings of Marxist dialectics. Contradictions are not merely a reaction to a proposition - thesis and antithesis come into being simultaneously. Hegel’s system avoided the central paradox of Plato’s dialectics: negation or contradiction does not produce the annihilation of premises but rather their transformation into something new. And new ideas do not show up ‘out of nowhere’, they emerge out of necessity from previous ones which have multiple ideas already embedded in them. They ‘come about of their own accord’, nothing new or extraneous is introduced from outside the system.

Famously, of course, Marx and Engels were ‘young Hegelians’, students of philosophy in Germany of the generation after Hegel, and were greatly influenced by him. However, Marx turned Hegel’s dialectic ‘upside down’ by stripping it of its Idealist trappings:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.” [Marx, ‘Capital’]

No longer was the evolution of ideas the driving engine of history. Rather, dynamism in the material world - which is unstable and ever-changing - generated other process that could or would operate at different levels of analysis. And these material processes and contradictions were merely reflected in the imperfect and partial models of them in human minds - which subsequent writers have labelled ‘ideology’. Most of Marx’s writings concern the application of this philosophy to history and political economy and it was only later writers who formally distinguished between dialectical materialism as a philosophical method and historical material as the Marxist application of that method to human economic history. One can and should apply to dialectical method to other subjects without invoking categories such as class, mode of production, and political revolution.

The unity of opposites

Dialectical materialism has never really been formalised as complete system, but most who use it as such invoke at least ‘three laws’ - though these are more like general observations than strict axioms (which again, would be ‘metaphysical’ thinking). I think each of these so-called laws carries an important insight, but unfortunately each is shrouded in a layer of mystification and obtuse, specialised terminology. Let us begin with the first ‘law’: the ‘unity of opposites’. For the dialectician, reality consists of objects in motion. But this is not merely movement: ‘the motion of matter is not merely crude mechanical motion, mere change of place, it is heat and light, electric and magnetic, chemical combination and dissociation, life and, finally, consciousness.’ [Engels, Dialectics of Nature] In other words, every object is always moving and interacting with other objects and if we know how and why an object is interacting then we know everything about it. As I put it in my second book, ‘the dynamics of an object shape its properties, not the other way around’.

The second insight of the dialectical method is that the forces that set objects in motion require interaction between objects - masses are attracted to one another, positive and negative attract, the nuclear forces work through the interactions of quarks with bosons etc. As Engels put it, ‘all [motion] in general [is] determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, and that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only in their mutual connection and union’. Natural systems, in other words, form an interconnected whole, in which every part may interact with every other part. Objects do not exist in isolation but their properties are mutually constituted through their relationships with other objects. What is true of physical systems, is also true of social ones: capitalism, patriarchy, and heteronormativity all come into being as systems (and in turn form a system of systems). Oppression does not occur owing to the existing of oppressive people, rather oppressor and oppressed come into being at the same time. The proletariat and bourgeoisie cannot be defined as classes in the abstract, but only mutually and through their interaction with one another. ‘The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies’. [Dialectics of Nature]

Finally, owing to this unity, we observe that the natural and social world relies for its existence on the mutual interpenetration and tension between opposing forces. The continued existence of a system depends on the presence of opposing properties, the interaction of which generates the dynamism which sustains the system. Positive and negative bind matter together, gravity and tension hold objects in place, the delicate colour balance of quantum chromodynamics holds the very atoms in your body together. The last example illustrates that the ‘unity of opposites’ does not imply strict binaries - atomic and social structures both may include more than two forces; the stability of any system is a result of the totality of forces acting. Violence, ideology, legitimation, bribery, coercion, consent - all play a role in maintaining the status quo. But all are necessary. Whether we call it a negation, opposite, contradiction etc, the key takeaway is that the coherence of categories requires the existence of opposing forces. The identity of an object is mutually constituted through the existence of other objects. Natural and social systems are not rigid, timeless hierarchies, but dynamic complex systems.

The transformation of quantity into quality

The second ‘law’ of dialectical materialism is the ‘transformation of quantity into quality’. This is much more straightforward concept and its materialist basis is easy enough to understand. But its application to sociology often eludes modern thinkers who are embedded in the framework of methodological individualism - the notion that the behaviour of the whole must be understood as a product of the behaviour of individual agents. Put simply, this law observes that the nature of an object or category can transform depending on the scale of its interactions, motions or relationships. Subtract heat from a gas, and it is still a gas; substract enough heat, however, and it liquefies, undergoing a phase change into a different object with different properties. A group of cells divides and grows in number until its parts specialise and the whole transform into a new developmental stage of the organism. Similarly, modern urban society is immensely more populous than tribal or agricultural societies, yet we are not simply living in a very large tribe. The sheer number of people organised to live together requires a qualitatively different form of social organisation, which different specialisations in the parts of the whole.

An individual worker may have limited capacity to challenge the powerful; however, when workers combines their efforts the are able to achieve more together than they ever could as individuals. Unions as institutions and labour as a class has more power than an individual worker; similarly, political parties and social movements are qualitative different from individual voters. Attempts to understand social change through analysis through the preferences of individual actors will necessarily fail. Complexity science increasingly uses the concept of phase changes between states to understand why social and biological transformations appear punctuated rather than linear. In evolutionary game theory, cooperative social agents may be individually less fit than competitive ones, but with a sufficient number of cooperative agents working together in close proximity and the game itself changes - now cooperation dominates.

Capital is more than simply an accumulation of surplus value; its mere concentration transforms it into a different category of social relationship. Capitalists are not merely ‘rich people’ who consume more than most; wealth generates social relationships that are qualitatively different from what agents without capital can enter into and it those relationships - not any particular quantity of money - that anti-capitalists must critique. In my first book, “Politics for the New Dark Age: Staying Positive Amidst Disorder” I already made use of this dialectical concept:

“[I]t is [conceptually] hard to distinguish politically and economically between poverty and inequality. Inequality can exist without absolute poverty, but the opposite is not true. They exist on a continuum and blur into one another. But in a rights-based framework, the distinction is clear. Poverty constitutes a denial of fundamental economic, social and cultural rights. Its existence negates the basic humanity of those affected; poverty is an either/or question. One either has access to adequate housing, education and health care or does not. Inequality constitutes the relative deprivation of those rights; it means that basic human needs are satisfied, but that access to different qualities of grades of that right is dependent on the economic power. Inequality is a distribution problem.”

What I was arguing, and this is a position that I stand by today, is that although there may be a certain distribution of injustice and unfairness in society (individual acts of violence or prejudice, bad luck, poor destruction, market failures etc.), when the quantity of these injustices increases above a certain threshold they can be treated as something entirely different - a systemic injustice. The core conceptual flaw of centrist IDW, ‘classical liberal’ types is their inability to be aware that injustice is more than merely the behaviour of individual bad actors - but rather that on a certain scale it transcends the actions or intent of individuals, and can only be perpetuated - or ended - through collective action. Systemic racism, sexism and transphobia are more than simply ‘lots of prejudice’ or ‘lots of bias’ in a quantitative sense. When prejudice is widespread, it can form a self-sustaining social equilibrium through the mutual constitution of social agents,

The negation of the negations

Finally, the third ‘law’ of dialectical materialism is the one most obtusely expressed, most commonly taught and most frequently misunderstood. The ‘negation of the negation’ simply observes the tendency for contradictions within a category to be resolved or dissolved as a materialist system transitions to a ‘higher’ level of organisation. In historical materialism - Marxism as applied to political economy - this resolution of the Hegelian dialectic represents the moment of revolutionary transition from one form of social organisation to another. Feudalism and capitalism were and are stable social structures, but they are also held together through dynamic tension and contradictions, that can fade away through the transition to a different mode of production. The original negations do not continue in their original form; instead, the new society [which is also a dynamic system] gives rise necessarily to a new a different set of contradictions.

It is important to note that as with all ‘laws’ of dialectical materialism, this is an observation, or an insight, not a prediction. There is a tendency in dynamic systems towards greater scale and complexity - but the timeline on which this occurs is not fixed and relies on both changes in the material environment and the accumulation of a vast number of small changes, that on their own, mean little but which in aggregate build towards an entirely new entity. In evolutionary biology, John Maynard-Smith called these moments of rupture ‘major evolutionary transitions’: think of when amino acids organised themselves into DNA, or proteins into cells, or cells into animals and plants, an individual organisms into complex ecosystems. When a major evolutionary transition occurs, there is a seemingly irrevocable change in the nature of a natural system. At this point, the individual agents which previously had an existence of their own now exist only as parts of a new whole, and can no longer sustain themselves outside of it; in turn, the new organism operates as a unique system in motion at a higher level of analysis.

Dialectical materialism, like evolutionary biology, therefore contains within it the hint of something like the inevitability of Progress (with a capital P) - not so different from Hegel after all. Of course, social and biological change is historically contingent, subject to reverses and unraveling, and operates on exceedingly long time periods. But the moral arc of the universe does bend ever so slightly towards justice, as MLK once famously said. This is because dynamic systems contain contradictions which tend to relax, dissipating the potential energy they contain. And the extinction of contradiction necessarily means the extinction of the order which it underpinned. Heteronormativity required the oppression of LGBT people, who fought to liberate themselves and thereby undermined heteronormativity as a whole, simultaneously liberating the straight majority from its grasp.

Classical Marxists made the understandable (albeit regrettable) mistake of believing that such transitions in human social life were not only inevitable but imminent. Like naïve Darwinists, they conceptualised human history as a series of fixed stages of increasing moral and economic complexity (from higher to lower). This kind of metaphysical, positivist thinking was common in the late nineteenth century - we cannot blame those living in such times from failing to fully escape the grips of the zeitgeist which, in Marxists terms, determined their ideology! Often, critics of dialectical materialism, like critics of social Darwinism, have in mind this sequential, nineteenth-century ideology - which I suspect is also easy for the metaphysician to understand. But the vulgar Marxists who understand dialectical material in these simple, categorical terms are not engaging with it as a method. It is merely sufficient to conclude by noting what Engels himself wrote near the end of his life: ‘For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher’.

Progress, like history, never ends.

Do genes matter? The hereditarian left wants you to act as if they do

The ‘hereditarian left’ is having a moment. I first wrote about this - still largely hypothetical - political tendency two-and-a-half years ago in the aftermath of the Sam Harris-Ezra Klein affair. That blog remains to this day one of the most viewed items on my page, largely I think because so few writers employ the terminology. That appears set to change, somewhat, with the publication of - and largely positive critical reaction to - “The Genetic Lottery: Why DNA matters for social equality” by Dr Paige Harden. Harden was on the side of the angels during the Sam Harris affair but as a fascinating profile in the New Yorker makes clear, she wants her new book to persuade those on the left ‘who insist that genes don’t matter’ of the error of their ways. As the New Yorker accurately notes,

“Harden is not alone . . . Last year, Fredrik deBoer published “The Cult of Smart,” which argues that the education-reform movement has been trammeled by its willful ignorance of genetic variation. Views associated with the “hereditarian left” have also been articulated by the psychiatrist and essayist Scott Alexander and the philosopher Peter Singer. Singer told me, of Harden, “Her ethical arguments are ones that I have held for quite a long time. If you ignore these things that contribute to inequality, or pretend they don’t exist, you make it more difficult to achieve the kind of society that you value.[Emphasis added]

Indeed, both DeBoer and Pinker have separately been crowing at the positive reception Harden’s latest has received. From the outset, I want to be clear that I’ve not yet read The Genetic Lottery, or DeBoer’s Cult of Smart for that matter. So this is not a book review. But I am familiar with both their work - I’ve cited Harden in the past - and despite his talents as a writer I’ve criticised DeBoer over his insistence that genetic variability in humans provides “the strongest possible argument for socialism”. I have no particular axe to grind with Harden and I trust, on the basis of other reviews I’ve read, that her new book is fair-minded summary of the science written by a world-renowned expert in the field and leavened with some standard social democratic politics. What I do take issue with is with the framing of the New Yorker piece - and Harden’s and DeBoer’s general thesis - that progressives need to be convinced that ‘genes matter’ and alter their political programs accordingly. But as we shall see, the real question is: what does it mean for something to ‘matter’?

Put simply, the argument of the handful of writers who make up the ‘hereditarian left’ is not dissimilar from that of the sex essentialists and evopsych gurus who argue for misogyny or against trans rights, or the ‘race realists’ of the like of Charles Murray and his many acolytes, or much of the heterodox thinking of the IDW [I’m not claiming they’re morally equivalent, just similarly fallacious]. All of these social movements and groups - containing an overrepresentation of aggrieved or wannabe scientists - argue passionately and at length that some observable trait (‘x’) in humans exists (or ‘is real’, or ‘matters’), which therefore [waves hands] justifies their [often reactionary] politics. When the left says we don’t care whether trait x is real, or that trait x ‘doesn’t matter’ to our politics, our lack of interest is caricatured with some snarl word like ‘blank slatists’ (Pinker’s idiotic term), science denialists or ‘cognitive creationists’. Whereas what’s actually happening is that the supposed heterodox thinkers are committing the most basic of errors - that of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ - of trying to justify and legitimise their preferred policy positions on the basis of supposed natural facts.

Genes influence behaviour, obviously, but whether that ‘matters’ depends on your frame of reference

The intransitive verb ‘to matter’ is one of those English words that sounds significant but whose meaning is vague and imprecise. Dictionaries tell us its a synonym for ‘important’, or something we care about. If x is some trait or observation, then x ‘matters’ or is relevant only if there is some relationship or function f(x) that produces a desirable goal or output. However, the essence of political disagreement is that humans rarely agree on what goals are ‘good’ or desirable, and whether the methods used to get there are legitimate. In other words, two people can only agree to normative (‘should’) statements when they implicitly or explicitly share the same objectives. For example, we can agree you should exercise but if and only if we first agree that fitness or health is our common goal.

I’ve written before that perhaps the single largest philosophical challenge of contemporary liberalism is the ‘problem of inequality’. To paraphrase Rousseau, man is born equal, but is everywhere unequal. Once liberal societies granted formal, legal equality to all citizens, the question became what degree of social, cultural and economic inequality could be tolerated before the narrative fiction that all human beings are alike in dignity could no longer be defended. The various liberal theodicies which have sprung up in response to this question give structure and context to the vast majority of contemporary political movements. On the progressive side - which includes both the anti-capitalist left and various types of left-liberals - our view is that when people are unequal we should change society somewhat to improve their conditions. Conservatives - including mainstream centre-right liberals and reactionaries - think that inequality is cool and normal, actually, and that we shouldn’t take any steps that would alter the status quo.

So yes, genes influence behaviour to some degree. Obviously. How we measure that influence, it’s mechanisms of action, and how it interacts with other sources of variability including socialisation, environment and pure dumb luck, are questions we can debate. But the influence is ‘real’, in the sense that it is observable, measurable, and falsifiable. In much the same way, sex traits and sexed differences are ‘real’ and group differences in behaviour are ‘real’ - but there is a difference between a fact being real (or provable) and a fact ‘mattering’. Your chromosomes and genitals simply don’t matter to the social performance of gender, for example. Your skin colour shouldn’t matter for your access to civil and political rights. Many observable human traits are simply irrelevant to both politics and political philosophy. A fact is only relevant if it changes how you pursue your goals – and progressives and conservatives have fundamentally different political goals. Which suggests that the same things may not matter in the same way to different people.

I’m just spitting science, bro

Harden was a graduate student and protégé of Eric Turkheimer, a behavioural geneticist whose views on this subject I respect immensely. In 1997, Turkheimer wrote an essay in which he argued that:

“A psychometric left would recognize that human ability, individual differences in human ability, measures of human ability, and genetic influences on human ability are all real but profoundly complex, too complex for the imposition of biogenetic or political schemata. It would assert that the most important difference between the races is racism, with its origins in the horrific institution of slavery only a very few generations ago. Opposition to determinism, reductionism and racism, in their extreme or moderate forms, need not depend on blanket rejection of undeniable if easily misinterpreted facts like heritability, or useful if easily misapplied tools like factor analysis. Indeed it had better not, because if it does the eventual victory of the psychometric right is assured.”

So he, too, I think would agree that progressive engagement with the science is important in order to rebut right-wing attempts to naturalise inequality - but the science cannot then form the basis of a just ‘political schemata’. So, a brief overview of the science of behavioural genetics - at least as I understand it from Turkheimer’s work - seems warranted. The origins of the field lie in so-called twin studies (DeBoer, I think fairly, calls these kinship studies as their basic unit of analysis is family relationships). If two siblings with a known degree of genetic relatedness (r) are raised, by circumstance, apart - and then their life outcomes are subsequently measured - it is in theory possible to calculate the effective contribution of genes vis-a-vis other facts such as upbringing, environment and random chance. Heritability, then, is an estimate of the contribution of biology to outcomes - in other words, if you had a large number of clones of an individual, to what degree their behaviour would vary as a result of non-genetic causes.

Twin studies are notoriously difficult to design - human lives are complex, and the potential confounding factors are many. More importantly, however, because of their limited number of available subjects twin studies tell you very little about the genetic variation within the broader population and next-to-nothing about genetic variation between populations. A twin study cannot tell you which genes are influencing outcomes or by what mechanism they are acting - only that biological similarity plays some role. The second stage of behavioural genetics - which took place largely in the 1990s and early 2000s - was premised on the idea that advances in scientific knowledge, in particular the completion of the Human Genome Project, would allow the identification of the ‘genes for’ particular traits. This turned out to be a disappointment. DNA is rarely so simple, and with the exception of some single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) associated with particular diseases, it turned out most genetic influence was pleiotropic - many genes influence many traits, through complex interactions and subtle influences that are often poorly understood. The challenge increases exponentially when we try to measure genetic influence over complex behaviours such as learning, sociability and sexuality.

Which brings us to the third and contemporary moment - that of the genome-wide association study (or ‘GWAS’). Readers may be vaguely familiar with the concept of factor analysis - which among other things is used in the psychological literature to generate measurement constructs such as g (for general intelligence). By combining the results of multiple tests (e.g. for language, spatial awareness, mathematical ability and problem solving), one can mathematically construct a single variable which best explains performance across multiple domains. A polygenic score is similar to this, but more complex by several orders of magnitude. Very sophisticated computer programs construct thousands or even millions of models combining the tiny influences of hundreds or even thousands of SNPs on an observed trait, settling on a model that offers the best statistical fit to the data. A polygenic score then sums up in a single variable the effect of all those genes - even if the specific identity of those genes or their mechanism of action remains unknown. Once again, these scores can produce quite good evidence of a genetic influence in diseases - the evidence, so far, for behavioural influence remains much weaker.

Turkheimer remains a vocal critic of the GWAS approach. Apart from the significant problem that a polygenic score is a statistical construct divorced from any investigation of the physical mechanism of action, the use of large data sets and machine learning to construct models means the field is doing something akin to ‘p-hacking’ - combing through data until an algorithm finds a result of statistical significance. The GWAS methodology is similar to the data mining approach used by many tech firms - the sort of analysis that predicts that consumers who wear red shoes on Thursdays are x% more likely to buy your product - and shares a similar problem in terms of model selection and validity. The most serious problem with polygenic scores, according to Turkheimer, is that the confidence intervals are rarely reported. A polygenic score may give you an estimate of the influence of your genes on, say, academic performance, but within a fairly wide band. So the predictive validity of a polygenic score for any given individual may be low - these are first and foremost population statistics. Large groups of people with particular scores may on average display the predicted traits, but the likelihood that any one individual will develop it is low. They are - like racial stereotypes or gender norms - poor predictors of individual behaviour and unsuitable for use in public policy formation.

As the New Yorker piece makes clear, Harden has moved away from her mentor’s scepticism in recent years - by all accounts, The Genetic Lottery is optimistic about the potential of the GWAS approach. There are hints in the piece at Harden’s evolving views - as a southerner with an evangelical background, a political ‘pragmatist’, and a successful white woman unaccustomed to receiving pushback from her left Harden is trying to identify the middle ground of these arguments. She highlights the importance of the genetic influence on behaviour while disavowing the dark policy prescriptions of the likes of Charles Murray and the race science crowd. But I - and most others on the left - would be sceptical that this is a line that can be walked, and definitely reject DeBoer’s thesis that it must be walked in order for the left to achieve its goals.

We just love debating tactics, don’t we?

The default progressive position is that we should remedy all social and economic inequalities regardless of cause. It’s not that genes don’t matter, is that no source of inequality matters. If your standard of living is below the poverty line we should fix that immediately without making moral or scientific inquiries as to why that circumstance has arisen. The real debate, if there is to be one, between the hereditarian left and other progressives is ultimately one of tactics (and oh boy, does the left love debating tactics!). To quote Harden from the New Yorker: “If you want to help people, you have to know what’s most effective, so you need the science.” In other words, is the left making our job of social reform harder by ignoring the science, as Peter Singer believes? Harden’s - and particular DeBoer’s - central contention is that in a realistic political environment, with limited space for progressives to pursue their priorities and the need to persuade others, the genetic influence on behaviour is a relevant source of inequality that should be factored into policy-making. Most socialists, for their part, argue that the dominant source of inequality is social structures and that until those social structures are changed, other interventions are likely to fail.

So DeBoer argues that education reforms have historically failed because they failed to take the genetic influence on cognition seriously. But perhaps a more parsimonious socialist critique would be that centrist plans that heavily focused on punishing teachers as part of an ideological project to undermine public schools were poorly conceived from the start. Until we begin to make serious structural changes to the allocation of resources in society, we simply cannot say that the material environment is not a significant factor shaping life outcomes for individuals. DeBoer and Harden would likely respond that kind of political and social revolution is impossible, and that the better political tactic would be to argue on the basis of luck-egalitarianism that the genetically disadvantaged are not to blame for their poor life outcomes, and that the state has a role to play in compensating for such undeserved inequality. Maybe, in the short term, they’re right. Luck egalitarianism is a respectable liberal philosophical position. But as the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has written, any liberalism that is predicated on the unlucky demonstrating their inferiority in order to receive aid from their social superiors undermines the promise of equal dignity at the heart of the liberal system. And given the innate human concern for relative social status, we’ve repeatedly seen that subaltern groups know and despise when elites treat them with pity - which in turn gives succour to reactionary forces.

Not just tactics - strategy

One of the most important political lessons I’ve learned - from the comms specialist Anat Shenkar Osorio - is that tactically sound decisions can be counterproductive in the long-term if they cede the framing of an issue to the right. Even if the hereditarian left was offering tactically sound advice - that interventions based on genetic influence on behaviour were more effective and more persuasive in moving people to support them - it would be strategically unsound. Because conservatives simply do not care about remedying social and economic inequalities. So when the hereditarian left argues that genes matter, they inevitably provide significant succour and support to the right, who can say “Yes, we agree, genes do matter, because they mean that some degree of hierarchy and inequality is natural and inevitable.” Which tends to put an end to movements for social reform.

I strongly suspect that the reason so much of the literature on genes and behaviour is focused on intelligence and academic performance is to, in some sense, legitimise and justify the liberal meritocratic ideal. Academic and journalistic elites - such as Harden, Pinker and DeBoer - are products of an education system that has granted them access to outsized social standing and influence. As the French economist Thomas Piketty has described, the Brahmin left values educational competition because they see their own achievements in that field as legitimising their social position. But if universities are just printing degrees for middle- and upper-class children whose parents paid their way through adolescence, then the Brahmin left’s social position - and the liberal meritocracy they promote - is in some sense illegitimate. For Pinker and the classical [right] liberal IDW crowd in particular, if academic achievement is sorting on the basis of something ‘real’ and unchangeable (i.e. genes), then the meritocratic hierarchy - Jordan Peterson’s hierarchy of talent - is legitimate and defensible.

Conservatives are simply uninterested in changing the status quo to remedy inequality. Whatever Harden and DeBoer may think, the right are not looking to be persuaded on this point, or to persuade others to implement egalitarian social policies. What they are looking for is evidence that legitimises and naturalises inequality and hierarchy, which in turn makes their job of resisting change and persuading others to resist change easier. So when the ‘hereditarian left’ argue that seeking change to social structures won’t be effective in eliminating inequality, or that certain inequalities are fixed and unalterable, they are doing the right’s work for them. So politically speaking, the genetic influence on behaviour doesn’t matter for the left because, in the first instance, we probably can’t make use of it, and in the second, doing so would actively aid our ideological opponents. Plenty of leftists can be and are interested in the science - myself included - and relish the intellectual opportunity to debate its merits. But it simply has no bearing on our politics other than being able to argue against the genetic essentialists and race realists. And that’s where Harden, Singer, DeBoer and their fellow travelers are gravely wrong. The hereditarian left is a dangerous, dead end.

Marx and Universal Human Rights

Libertarian or democratic socialists - in contrast to more authoritarian members of the socialist tradition - tend to preserve and maintain their philosophical links to more mainstream liberal beliefs, and represent their political program [correctly] as an evolution or perfection of the clearly flawed and self-serving modern liberal democratic state. Among the liberal values that socialists defend are the fundamental so-called human rights - political, civic, social, economic and cultural. A society that truly guaranteed all the rights identified in that tradition to would not only be normatively desirable, but in all likelihood have a radically re-imagined political and economic structure. I am of course guilty myself of this philosophical borrowing, writing at length about the desirability of orienting radical politics around ‘fundamental rights’ in my first book, “Politics for the New Dark Age: Staying Positive Amidst Disorder”.

In Chapter 12 of my second book, “Evolutionary Politics: Socialism for Social Species” [Available Now!], I endorse what is broadly known as the ’social theory’ of rights.

“We cannot therefore speak of the ‘natural rights’ of individuals as the early liberal philosophers did. A person alone in a state of nature has no claims to make on another, and therefore no claims by others to be protected against. All norms are social norms and all rights are social rights.”

In other words, my position on rights is that they are dialectical - worked out through social relationships, and in many respects constitutive of interpersonal relationships in societies delineated by that kind of symbolic legal norm. All laws, norms and institutions are strategic solutions to the problems of group life, and as such these norms evolve in a historically contingent way in response to the material conditions of the group. A necessary corollary of the social theory of rights is that the content and scope of rights can vary depending on the social context - different populations with different structures or facing different problems may understand rights differently, as liberal societies of course did at different historical stages of their own development. For many advocates of a rights-based approach to philosophy, law and morality, the social theory of rights is unacceptable precisely because it means ‘human rights’ are not truly human rights because the benefits and privileges attaching to those claim vary by place, time and culture - what we have instead are the rights of Americans, Chinese citizens, Ugandan citizens and so on.

The social theory of rights is juxtaposed in the literature against several alternative theories, the first and foremost of which are natural law theories. The natural law tradition states that rights are observable features of the universe, which the modern liberal democratic state has merely discovered and codified through the use of “capital-R Reason”, or through its unique historical experiences, or as a result of its unique history, culture or traditions etc. The natural law tradition has its origins in religious belief - “all men are created equal” - but does not require a specific spiritual belief to be true. Natural rights are laws of the universe since, as Spinoza believed, a creator deity could not create natural laws that were contrary to Reason - nor could any rational sovereign.

The alternative, that we liberal humanists in law school used to frown upon, is the legal positivist school, which argues that rights are not observable features of the universe, but rather contingent grants of privileges by legal authorities. In other words, human rights as we know them today did not exist before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written (which is unenforceable anyway), and the only rights an individual may claim are those that are enforceable through the legal and executive arms of a particular state. Whether we regard this cynical view positively (as conservatives do) or negatively (as most Marxists and social critics do), it’s hard to argue that it’s at least trivially true - the rights we think we have today are specific legal entitlements that were granted by specific sovereign authorities under specific historical circumstances. For a traditionalist, what gives human rights their power is that they were granted by righteous authorities and have stood the test of time in the face of subsequent historical events.

Materialism and Liberalism

Let’s presume for a moment that universal human rights are a desirable ethical good. It’s trivially true that a resident of Mogadishu, Somalia does not enjoy the same degree of protection of their right to life as a citizen of Canberra, Australia; it’s trivially true that the material capacity of a Western European state to guarantee a basic standard of living, good quality healthcare and education, and a right to housing, is dramatically better than the capacity of Sierra Leone or the Solomon Islands. Yet of course, as humanists and egalitarians, we want the citizens of Mogadishu, Freetown and Honiara to enjoy the same standard of human rights as ourselves. In Leninism there’s a concept of “the transformation of quantity into quality”. In other words, a material leap forward, or leap backwards, can be so significant as to categorically change the classification of an object, process or social relation. From a human rights perspective, it’s clear that a relative deprivation of rights can be so severe that we would no long recognise that an individual was having their rights - and thus their equal dignity as a member of our species - respected at all.

Marxism is a materialist philosophy. We do not begin from the supposition of abstract principles about the nature of human life and deduce our political beliefs from these idealist abstractions, but instead are interested first and foremost in social conditions as they actually are. In many instances, this allows us to see the good work that has been done by the bourgeois revolutions - but not be so blinded by their philosophical commitments that we can’t criticise them. Socialists are somewhat less prone than liberals to the disappointment of theory not matching reality. Marx was of course correct when he cynically observed that liberal rights were first and foremost bourgeois rights - to negative liberty, property and security of the individual against the state - but we need not give in to such cynicism and reject the idea of universal human rights in their entirety, as many historical communists did.

“None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society – that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community. In the rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being; on the contrary, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework external to the individuals, as a restriction of their original independence. The sole bond holding them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves.”

I’ve discussed Marx’s concept of ‘species-being’ or ‘Gattungswesen’ in an earlier blog, but to quickly summarise, the Marxist theory of human nature begins and ends with his or her existence as a material being. The fact that human beings share common needs - food clothing, shelter, health, education, culture - creates a common ‘human nature’. “The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body – both inasmuch as nature is his direct means of life, and the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity.” In process philosophy such as Marxism, the essence of an object is defined by its relationships (not the other way round, as in classical metaphysics) as a result human nature is defined by the totality of human social and material relationships.

Thus, from the concept of species-being, it it relatively straightforward to recover the universality of human rights from a Marxist framework. Rights are those material needs which are necessary for the full development of the human individual, and which the individual cannot guarantee through their own powers such that they enter into social relationships and constructs in order to secure them. And while a society’s ability to secure fundamental rights may vary by material circumstances, our shared biological and cultural inheritance as humans means we have much more in common than we differ from one another. Both Marxists and universalist liberals would look equally aghast at the argument of some pro-state or pro-capitalist developmentalists that, actually, the citizens of Mogadishu, Freetown or Honiara don’t need as much food, shelter or healthcare as citizens of the West.

Class and Dialectics

One of the fundamental misunderstandings of both critics of socialism and vulgar Marxists is to fall into the metaphysical trap of treating Marxist concepts as categories and not social relationships. We have human rights not thanks to some innate spark or divine soul which makes us distinct from the rest of nature, but because we’re utterly reliant on making claims on each other in order to satisfy those material conditions of life which make us distinct as a species. We are treated as members of a certain race or ethnic group for sociological purposes not because of the colour of our skin or our place of birth, but because of how other people and social structures treat us based on those superficial and meaningless tags. We are coded as male or female not on arbitrary sexual characteristics observed at birth, but because others treat us in culturally-specific and largely arbitrary ways based - partly but not wholly - on those characteristics. Identity and performance cannot be separated entirely from one another since, as Marx wrote, “The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process . . . .life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.

In this way, class position is, also, a fundamentally dialectical relationship. For Marx, a huge component of what makes us human is the observation that we must produce those things we need to satisfy our material needs, and that the act of production is in large part a social activity. The only way that human beings can grow sufficient food to feed ourselves, to refine the raw materials and assemble the finished goods which are characteristic of us as succesful, tool-using species is by entering into social relationships with others. And because production is a social activity, those who relate to production in different ways will be treated in different ways, and may come to see themselves as a members of different groups. Class position is not a matter of antagonism between rich and poor, determinable by some crude measure of wealth or income. It is about your material relationship to the means of production and your self-conscious identification of your social position in relation to production.

So, for instance, if you own your own home (no matter how expensive), then you are not a ‘capitalist’, since you are both the producer and consumer of housing services and you are not involved in any dialectical relationships with other people (partners and children notwithstanding). On the other hand, if a bank or landlord owns your home, then you have entered into dialectical relationship that contains within it the potential for class antagonism. Similarly, if you’re a retiree or pensioner who funds their retirement through taxes or savings generated through your labour (and with the caveat that those savings are stored in particular assets), then congratulations, you’re still a member of the working class even if your labouring days are long behind you. And yes, small business owner, you may ‘own’ your tools in the classical sense -your ‘means of production’ - but the odds are good that to get your business up and running you’ve taken loans or investments, you rent vehicles or properties form someone else, you rely on a technology platform you don’t own to advertise or to send you customers, or if you’re a franchisee, you might not own the intellectual property to your own goods and services. So your relationship to those who truly own the means of production is that of worker to capital.

Because society is complex, one’s class position is never binary; and the structures of modern capitalism often work to disguise or complicate those relationships as much as possible. Your class position may vary across different aspects of your life and relationships. A significant portion of private savings, for example, are not simple stored as cash or bonds but in the stock market, largely in the form of pension funds or passive investment vehicles. This puts private savers in a position of potential antagonism with the workers in those firms, because both groups make claims on the surplus value produced. The market works to obfuscate that antagonism, by distributing ownership widely (if you own stock in IBM, the odds of you interacting with an employee of that firm as an owner are miniscule) and by putting in place managerial intermediaries who exercise authority over workers within the firm on behalf of owners and thereby shield them from the hostility of the labouring class.

The professional-managerial class, a phenomenon largely unknown to the 19th century, therefore represents a very real phenomenon owing to the contradiction between their relationship to production and their self-conscious class position. The PMCs are almost entirely working class in a material sense - their salaries may be high, but they still survive based on labour rather than capital income - but whether out of ideological indoctrination or simple self interest, they identify their class position with that of capital and the capitalist system, acting as its enforcers, guardians, defenders and high-priests. That is true whether they are literal managers of firms, or members of the NGO industrial complex working to promote and advance human rights. Building a working-class movement that somehow includes or subordinates the PMCs is perhaps one of the defining challenges of the modern left - a task we cannot even begin to attempt until left-liberals and socialists start speaking a mutually intelligble language.

On the use and abuse of Social Darwinism: Sam Ashworth-Hayes in Quillette

There was an article published on 17 November in Quillette by UK-based writer Sam Ashworth-Hayes that highlights once again the ways that a little evolutionary knowledge can be dangerous. For the record, and being extremely charitable, Quillette is a Social Darwinist newsletter that publishes Social Darwinist articles by Social Darwinist writers. And I’m not familiar with Sam’s broader output but I have serious questions about his seemingly obsessive focus on Western fertility and whether a “culture which combines high migration alongside low integration and fertility will be replaced”.

That caveat made, however, I’ve elected to wade in because Sam’s writing combines familiarity with the key concepts of cultural evolution with a blatant and ignorant portrayal of both how it works and how political progressives might make use of it. To do a little shameless self-promotion, my second book, “Evolutionary Politics: Socialism for Social Species” [which will be available worldwide November 30th!] aims to dispel once and for all the notion that there is no left-wing theory of human nature that is compatible with Darwin. And it makes the point that darwinian socialism is a venerable left-wing tradition - with roots going back to Bakunin, Engels and Kropotkin - which is not only embedded in a dialectical understanding of human societies but is ‘more scientific’ than the mainstream rational-actor model.

Use and Abuse

To begin, Sam’s reading of how evolution works is too teleological. Like Spencer, Huxley and the other Victorian scientists who interpreted Darwin, he’s wrong to portray cultural selection as an engine of inevitable progress, rather than a quasi-random walk though history, with side-branches, dead-ends and backsliding aplenty.

“From a Darwinian perspective, the point of a culture is to replicate itself. From this, all else follows. The rules and rites that govern a society fall into shape as systems for maximising the fitness of a culture for surviving its environment”.

Cultures of course, do not have a ‘point’. Cultures may act as if they were maximising fitness, but this is only because cultures which failed to be competitive no longer survive. But Sam is broadly correct when he paraphrases that tradition embodies “a set of solutions for which we have forgotten the problems”.

As I explain in Chapters 16 & 17 of my new book, conservative writers and thinkers are often prone to a naturalistic fallacy, where they presume that any behaviour or tradition which presently exists must do so because it is adaptive. And that traditions or behaviours which are adaptive must, in naturalistic ethics, be therefore considered good. Sam has done his reading, and does not fall easily into this trap. In fact, his summary of this is quite accurate:

“Not all behaviours are adaptive; some are vestigial, remnants of a tradition previously of great importance. Some are not harmful enough to be shed, inefficiencies in a world full of such things, or covered for by other habits. Some were useful and are rendered obsolete by changes in technology, or the capability of society to organise itself. Some are maladaptive, and in the process of being selected against, or sustained in a bad equilibrium.”

But here’s where things start to go off the rails a little bit. It’s of course an extremely difficult question to determine which social behaviours are adaptive and which are not. Sam’s list of adaptive traditions, focused primarily on sexual behaviour, is questionable. Taboos on sexual promiscuity and abortion, as well as social valuation of monogamy, are all debatable points. I would suspect Sam has been reading a bit too much of the evopsych literature, which is heavily focused on these questions of gender relations. I would note for example, that fear of disease becomes of less adaptive relevance in societies with modern medicine and good quality healthcare. And that social and religious attitudes towards abortion have varied widely across different time periods and cultures. I think both Silvia Federici and Jo Henrich might agree that the Western anxiety over abortion has as much to do with the relationship between the family and capital as it has to do with fertility. Indeed, the very debate over the ‘personhood’ of a fetus relies on the modern, liberal ontological framework that grants rights only to philosophical ‘persons’.

Bad philosophy, bad science

I won’t take too much issue with Sam’s characterisation of liberalism. Chapters 13 & 18 my book discuss a couple of ways in which liberalism, as an evolving cultural complex, is uniquely vulnerable. But I’m more appreciative of just how successful and sustainable liberalism has been, since it first emerged as a distinct set of cultural strategies in 17ths and 18th-century Europe. In that time period, it has spread to become the default philosophical position in Westernised nations, converted hundreds of millions of other people to its way of seeing the world, fought off multiple challenger ideologies (including during multiple periods of total war) and delivered astounding advances in material and social progress. Like Marx, I’m an admirer of liberalism, but as socialist, I recognise that it “points beyond itself”.

Sam’s advocacy of higher fertility ultimately fails because he does not understand how cultural replication works - a fault of most Social Darwinists, and incidentially a point on which many sociologists and constructivists have useful things to say. Any evolutionary system is defined by three key processes - variation, selection and replication. Because many Social Darwinists are genetic essentialists, they assume wrongly that the only way a behaviour can be transmitted is through descent. i.e. that liberal cultures reproduces themselves by having more children, who are somehow biologically predisposed to being more liberal. Sam, to his credit, recognises that liberalism may spread through the ‘conversion’ of others, and hey, he’s completely right on that. Culture spreads through teaching and imitation and comparatively little of the behaviour of modern humans is encoded genetically - a much greater proportion of our strategies are learned in childhood, either from our parents or absorbed from our teachers, peers and other members of our culture.

John Maynard-Smith, the biologist and mathematician who laid much of the groundwork for evolutionary game theory, originally rejected the concept of group selection precisely because genetic inheritance was a poor mechanism to maintain inter-group differences. When breeding-age individuals migrate between groups, they contribute half of their DNA to any offspring. Very quickly, this extinguishes the genetic diversity between groups that is mathematically necessary for group selection to function - and humans are certainly a migratory and promiscuous species! But when humans migrate between social groups they also inherit behaviours culturally and tend to more-or-less conform to the culture of their new home. A human who left their home tribe to migrate to a new one might contribute half their DNA to their offspring, but much less of their cultural complex. As a result, cultural evolution maintains sufficient intra-group cohesion for group selection to operate.

Sam writes that “those raised by parents of other cultures may not always turn out to be liberals.” This is of course, true. A small minority may in fact violently reject their new culture. But in the vast, vast majority of cases migrants successfully accommodate themselves to the culture of their new home, especially ones that ask relatively little of them in return. It’s a tired cliché, but by the third generation migrant communities are often largely culturally indistinguishable from other inhabitants of a place.

In defense of liberalism

But of course the question of migration is only relevant insofar as Sam defines the terms of the debate in terms of liberalism’s consequences for population size and fertility. I hate to be the one to tell the readers of Quillette this, but smaller family sizes are both a consequence of and a contributor to higher levels of parental and societal investment in children, such that individuals in liberal societies are astoundingly more productive than their forebears who had more children. I would note that many of the countries with the lowest fertility in the world - South Korea, Singapore, Japan - have only a recent historical association with liberalism, and those in Europe with the lowest fertility - Spain, Italy, Portugal - are largely Catholic and only recently democracies. Sam also ignores the extensive sociological and economic literature that correlates below-replacement birth rates with economic inequality and low social mobility, as well as the strong leftist support for ‘pro-natalist’ policy proposals such as universal childcare and worker control over their terms of their labour.

I’m uninterested in having a debate with any writer for Quillette of their critique of ‘progressivism’, which is childish and irrelevant. But I will engage with alt-centrist writers who argue their critique in terms of evolutionary science. The debate between Social Darwinism and darwinian socialism has been going on now for more than 150 years. It would be fair to say that for much of the twentieth century the Social Darwinists won that debate. There is an ongoing and serious risk that racial supremacist arguments are being repackaged and recycled in terms of cultural supremacy. By understanding how genes and culture co-evolve, and work together to generate complex social behaviour, progressives can make a stronger case that social change and experimentation has been, is and will continue to be both ‘adaptive’ and ‘good’.